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BANK OF AMERICA V. CITY OF MIAMI:
STANDING AND CAUSATION UNDER THE
FAIR HOUSING ACT
Alan M. White*
I. INTRODUCTION
Progress towards racial equality in America has been a long
journey, of many steps forward and many steps backward. The crisis
of 2007-2008 was a large step backwards in the struggle for economic
equality, in which the homeownership gains of African-Americans
during the 1980s and 1990s were submerged in a historic wave of
foreclosures and home losses. In Bank of America v. City of Miami,1
the Supreme Court confronted two vital questions of responsibility
under the equality norms of the 1968 Fair Housing Act: 1) whose
actions are responsible for the persistent residential segregation and
inequality (causation), and 2) who are the victims of housing
segregation who may hold the responsible parties to account
(standing)? The Court’s compromise decision allowing the case to
proceed was a step forward on the standing issue and a step backwards
on causation. The majority opinion reflected its continuing
ambivalence towards recognizing racial segregation as a systemic and
intractable feature of our society, both accepting and denying the
broad and shared responsibility for causing this structural inequality
and for breaking it down.
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Housing Segregation and the 1968 Fair Housing Act
Black and white Americans have lived in segregated housing in
segregated neighborhoods since the beginning of the twentieth

* Alan M. White is Professor of Law at CUNY School of Law; he co-authored the Housing
Scholars’ amicus curiae brief in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami.
1. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
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century.2 The racial apartheid in American cities was the product of a
systemic public-private collaboration, combining private housing
market conduct (the actions of white homeowners and landlords) and
federal, state and local government policies. In response to the first
waves of the great migration of former slaves to the North in the early
1900s, several cities adopted ordinances restricting the areas in which
blacks could rent or buy homes.3 The Supreme Court struck down
these racial zoning laws under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, because of the direct state involvement in
explicit racial discrimination.4 In response, white homeowners banded
together to sign racially restrictive covenants preventing the sale of
homes to nonwhites. The Supreme Court eventually held in 1948 that
judicial enforcement of those covenants was unconstitutional state
action in Shelley v. Kraemer. 5 From the time public housing came into
being in the 1930s, local public housing authorities reinforced racial
segregation through their siting and tenant assignment policies.6 The
Federal government also played a major role in mortgage redlining,
denying mortgage credit to minority neighborhoods.7 The
Homeowners Loan Corporation of the New Deal, followed by the
Federal Housing Administration and Veteran’s Administration
mortgage insurance programs of the post-War period, promoted the
use of racially restrictive covenants and cut off mortgage credit to
integrated or minority neighborhoods, and denied cheap home
financing to African-Americans.8 The unique hypersegregation of
African-Americans in urban ghettoes has resulted from a continual
and complex interplay of individual, corporate, and government
policies, decisions, and behaviors.9 Residential segregation is at the
root of many other forms of racial inequality, in education, health,

2. JAMES H. CARR & NANDINEE K. KUTTY, The New Imperative for Equality, in
SEGREGATION, THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 1–3 (Gregory Squires ed., 2008).
3. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal
Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005, 1022 (1992).
4. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
5. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
6. Richard Rothstein, Public Housing: Government-Sponsored Segregation, THE AM.
PROSPECT (Oct. 11, 2012), https://prospect.org/article/public-housing-government-sponsoredsegregation.
7. Id.
8. CARR & KUTTY, supra note 2, at 21–22.
9. See GREGORY D. SQUIRES & CHARIS E. KUBRIN, PRIVILEGED PLACES: RACE,
RESIDENCE, AND THE STRUCTURE OF OPPORTUNITY (2006).
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employment, and even physical safety,10 and has been one of the most
difficult legacies of Jim Crow to dismantle.
In the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress chose not to take
on housing discrimination, and specifically exempted the federal
housing agencies (the Federal Housing Authority and the Veteran’s
Administration mortgage programs) from that Act’s coverage.11 It was
only after the long hot summers of 1964-1966, the Kerner
Commission report on urban riots, and finally the assassination of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968, that Congressional resistance gave
way, at least partly, and the 1968 Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) was
passed. 12 Even then, it was only two decades later that Congress made
effective enforcement of the FHA possible.
The original FHA was designed by Congress to be only weakly
enforceable. The 1968 Act limited Justice Department enforcement to
cases involving a pattern or practice of discrimination, or issues of
general public importance; damages awarded to private plaintiffs were
typically very modest.13 It wasn’t until the 1988 Fair Housing
Amendments Act14 that Congress authorized full private and federal
agency enforcement in individual as well as pattern and practice cases.
The 1988 amendments added disability as a protected class, allowed
the Department of Housing and Urban Development to investigate
discrimination complaints and award damages and injunctions,
allowed the Justice Department to bring civil enforcement actions
without needing to show a pattern, practice, or an issue of general
public importance, and increased the punitive damages cap from
$1,000 to $10,000 in individual civil actions.15
Although the Fair Housing Act covered mortgage lending
discrimination since its enactment in 1968,16 most of the early
enforcement, by the government and private parties, was directed at
discrimination in renting homes and selling homes and at exclusionary
zoning practices of local planning agencies. Fair lending enforcement

10. PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF
PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013).
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
12. Douglas S. Massey, The Legacy of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, 30 SOC. F. 571–88 (2015).
13. GEORGE R. METCALF, FAIR HOUSING COMES OF AGE (1988).
14. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619.
15. Id.
16. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 42 U.S.C. § 805.
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began in earnest after the 1988 amendments and continued to expand
through the passage of the 1991 amendments to the 1974 Equal Credit
Opportunity Act.17 The impact of mortgage lending discrimination on
housing segregation might seem more remote, and the actions of
mortgage lenders less directly responsible, than the racially biased
practices of private landlords, realtors, and public housing authorities.
Nevertheless, banks and the federal mortgage agencies were and are
critical to the creation and perpetuation of residential segregation, and
no societal plan to end housing segregation could be complete without
taking on the lending policies and practices of banks and the mortgage
industry.
B. Supreme Court Cases Under the FHA
The early Fair Housing Act cases to come before the Court
involved overt discrimination by landlords and realtors against
minority applicants. In those cases, the Court repeatedly faced issues
of identification: who are the “victims” of housing discrimination and
racial segregation entitled to sue, and who are the actors whose
conduct is responsible for it, and who should therefore be liable?
These intertwined issues of standing, causation, and intent are featured
in most of the Court’s significant Fair Housing Act cases.
In its first decision interpreting the FHA, Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,18 the Court faced the victim identification
issue. All nine justices agreed that black and white tenants in an
apartment building had standing under the statute to sue their landlord
for discriminating against nonwhite applicants.19 The tenants asserted
that they were injured by losing the social and business benefits of
living in an integrated community.20 The Trafficante decision was
remarkable in its broad reading of statutory standing and its
recognition that race discrimination by landlords affects persons other
than the rejected applicants. Significantly, the Court unanimously held
that Congress had defined the class of persons harmed by housing
discrimination broadly, and that losing the opportunity to live in a
17. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-145, FAIR LENDING: FEDERAL
OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT IMPROVED BUT SOME CHALLENGES REMAIN at 5 (1996); John R.
Walter, Fair Lending Laws and Their Enforcement, 81 FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. Q.
61, 68 (1995).
18. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
19. Id. at 212.
20. Id.

51.2_WHITE_V.9 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

STANDING AND CAUSATION UNDER THE FHA

4/5/19 5:20 PM

417

racially integrated community is a redressable injury.21
The Trafficante decision was followed two years later by an
uncontroversial decision that civil plaintiffs asserting FHA claims are
entitled to a jury trial.22 Then in the next two FHA cases to reach the
Court, both again raising standing questions, the Court reiterated the
broad view that civil actions could be brought not just by home buyers
or renters turned away based on their race, but by residents of the
community affected by race discrimination, and even by the
community itself.
In Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,23 the plaintiffs were
residents of the town who acted as testers in uncovering racial steering
by the defendant realtors, and the village itself, which asserted that the
realtors’ racial steering and blockbusting24 reduced property values,
and hence property tax revenues.25 White testers were steered towards
all-white neighborhoods, while black testers were steered towards an
integrated neighborhood.26 Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
found that these adverse consequences of racial steering were direct
and profound, and amply qualified the plaintiffs, as residents of the
affected community, to assert FHA claims.27 The opinion recognized
not only the social harm to residents and the town caused by racial
segregation as in Trafficante, but also the economic loss in property
values and property tax revenues that flows from segregation.28
Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent joined by Justice Stewart, put
forward the more narrow view of who is harmed by housing
discrimination. He argued that the civil remedy Congress authorized
should be available only to the “direct” victims of discrimination, i.e.,
the parties to individual housing denials or racial steering, rather than
to their neighbors.29 This narrow view of standing sounded a theme
that echoes through a number of later dissenting opinions written by
21. Id. at 208–09.
22. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 191 (1974).
23. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
24. “Blockbusting” refers to the practice of exploiting the fear of white homeowners that
nonwhites are moving into their neighborhood in order to persuade them to sell quickly, while
simultaneously promoting home sales to minority buyers in the same neighborhood, all in order to
generate profits for realtors. See Amine Ouazad, Blockbusting: Brokers and the Dynamics of
Segregation, 157 J. ECON. THEORY 811, 812 (2015).
25. Gladstone Realtors, 441 U.S. at 94–95, 109.
26. Id. at 95.
27. Id. at 110.
28. Id. at 110–11.
29. Id. at 126 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the Court’s conservative justices.
In its third major FHA standing case, Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman,30 the Court recognized injury, and hence standing, for a
tester, an African-American who did not actually intend to rent an
apartment, but applied for housing and was given false information by
a landlord.31 The white tester was told, accurately, that housing was
available, while the African-American tester, who did not intend to
rent an apartment, was falsely told no units were available.32 The court
held, that the violation of the right to receive accurate information
about housing availability was enough of an injury to warrant FHA
standing.33 This informational injury was in addition to the type of
neighborhood or community injury recognized in Gladstone Realtors
and Trafficante. The court also held that a white tester who received
accurate information was not injured, and therefore, would not have
standing.34 Justice Brennan’s opinion, written for a unanimous court,
was perhaps the high water mark for the Court’s broad interpretation
of FHA standing.
In the recent FHA cases coming before the Court, the theme
changed from who is harmed by discrimination to who should be held
responsible. Defendants raised various arguments to avoid liability,
disclaiming any intent to discriminate, and denying that their conduct
was the proximate cause of housing inequality. The issue of
discriminatory intent arose repeatedly when federal agencies and
private plaintiffs relied on proof of disparate impact as their theory of
discrimination. Disparate impact theory, first approved by the Court
in an employment discrimination case,35 holds a defendant responsible
for any uniform policy or practice that disadvantages minority
applicants and does not further a legitimate business purpose.
Disparate impact discrimination does not depend on proof of the
defendant’s discriminatory intent.36 In its enforcement of the FHA,
HUD consistently applied disparate impact analysis to a wide variety
of public and private housing practices.37 Eventually most of the
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

455 U.S. 363 (1982).
Id. at 374.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 373–74.
Id. at 374–75.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
Id. at 432.
Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
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federal Circuit Courts of Appeals ruled that disparate impact analysis
was appropriate for FHA claims.38 In 2013, HUD adopted a regulation
making explicit its prior interpretation that the FHA permits a finding
of discrimination based on disparate impact analysis.39
The first FHA disparate impact case considered by the Supreme
Court involved a public zoning board’s ordinance that severely
restricted the sites where multifamily housing could be built in the
town, with the effect of virtually excluding minority residents from
living there.40 The Court affirmed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
decision invalidating the ordinance in a per curiam decision.41 The
very brief opinion holds that the record as it stood was sufficient to
make out a claim of disparate racial impact of the local zoning
ordinance.42 The Court also noted that the defendant had conceded the
applicability of disparate impact analysis.43 The legal issue whether
the FHA authorized disparate impact analysis as a basis for liability
was, therefore, left to another day.44
That day finally arrived in 2015, in the case of Texas Dept. of
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc.45 On two prior occasions, the Court had granted certiorari in cases
raising the same issue, but in each case the parties settled before the
Court could rule.46 The Texas DHCA case involved a challenge by a
nonprofit advocacy group to a state agency’s site selection decisions
in allocating low-income housing subsidies.47 The plaintiffs claimed
that the DHCA’s policy of locating subsidized low-income housing in
heavily minority neighborhoods contributed to furthering racial
segregation.48
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, grounded the Court’s
definitive approval of disparate impact analysis in the sad legacy of
2543 (2015).
38. Id.
39. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
40. Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 16 (1988) (per curiam).
41. Id. at 18.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
46. Magner v. Gallagher, 565 U.S. 1013 (2011); Township of Mount Holly v. Mount Holly
Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013).
47. Texas DHCA, 135 S. Ct. at 2514.
48. Id.
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various government policies including redlining, steering, and
restrictive covenants, that insured the persistence of geographic
segregation of races in the United States and perpetuated our vast
opportunity and wealth gaps.49 In the opinion, he referred to the Kerner
Commission’s conclusion that the uprisings of the 1960s arose in no
small measure from the ghettoization and racial apartheid of American
cities.50
Justice Kennedy began by comparing the FHA to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, which has been long understood by the Court to
permit disparate impact analysis.51 He then relied heavily on the fact
that in the 1988 FHA Amendments, Congress seemed to approve, at
least implicitly, a disparate impact approach.52 Several exceptions
from FHA liability added by Congress—for example, permitting
discrimination based on criminal drug convictions—would make no
sense if Congress did not understand the FHA as covering disparate
impact discrimination.53 Kennedy continued that disparate impact
analysis is an important tool for achieving the central goal of the FHA,
and is a useful means to uncover unconscious and covert racism.54
In the remainder of his discussion, Justice Kennedy shifted gears,
and went to considerable lengths to insist that courts give broad leeway
to FHA defendants in evaluating their business justifications for
suspect policies.55 He insisted that the a policy with a disparate impact
need not meet a “necessity” test, but will be immune from FHA
challenge if it is necessary to achieve a “valid interest.”56 Valid
interests, he continued, may include many objective and subjective
factors, including “market factors”, cost, historic preservation, and
quality of life.57 In other words, the decisions of developers and
housing agencies that exclude or limit housing for minorities may be
insulated from discrimination challenges if one of these non-racial
factors is successfully invoked as the “valid interest” being pursued by
the challenged policy. So, for example, the defendant state agency in

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 2515.
Id. at 2516.
Id.
Id. at 2519.
Id. at 2521.
Id. at 2521–22.
Id. at 2522.
Id. at 2523.
Id. at 2523.
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the Texas DHCA case could assert that its valid interest in helping the
poor justifies its policy of subsidizing new low-income housing in
segregated minority neighborhoods. Justice Kennedy’s admonition
requires courts to give these asserted policy interests substantial
deference.
In a similar vein, Justice Kennedy highlighted the importance of
causation as an element in a disparate impact FHA claim, although
causation was not an issue before the Court in the case. He noted that
defendants should not be held liable for racial disparities they did not
create; otherwise, governmental agencies and market actors might be
forced to adopt racial quotas.58 The Texas DHCA might, for example,
claim that its policy of building new subsidized housing in segregated
neighborhoods was not the proximate cause of racial segregation,
which instead was a product of private market decisions and other
forces.
Thus, the decision in Texas DHCA giveth and it taketh away.
Disparate impact analysis, and the ability to assert FHA violations
without proving racist intent, is available, yes. But plaintiffs must run
the gauntlet of disproving the defendants’ litany of nonracial “valid
interests” for discriminatory policies, and then show the causal
connection between defendants’ policies and racial exclusion or
segregation, in a context where the exclusion and segregation have
been the legacy of decades.
The American Bankers Association filed an amicus brief in the
Texas DHCA case,59 as it did in the two prior cases challenging
disparate impact analysis, although none of the Court’s FHA cases to
date had involved discrimination in home mortgage lending. The keen
interest of the banking industry arose from the fact that the Justice
Department and private plaintiffs began bringing more and more
discrimination claims against lenders using disparate impact analysis,
especially under Attorney General Eric Holder starting in 2009.60
Government and private plaintiffs had begun to bring FHA challenges
to a number of mortgage lending practices, such as minimum loan
58. Id.
59. Brief for Am. Bankers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Texas Dep’t
of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 131371), 2014 WL 6660911 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
60. See Andrew Sandler & Kirk Jensen, Disparate Impact in Fair Lending: A Theory Without
a Basis and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 33 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 18
(2014); see also Brief for Petitioners, supra note 59.

51.2_WHITE_V.9 (DO NOT DELETE)

422

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

4/5/19 5:20 PM

[Vol. 51:413

amounts, broker pricing discretion, steering of borrowers to subprime,
high-rate mortgages, and geographic redlining.61
The banks argued that disparate impact analysis would stifle the
market for mortgage loans, making banks overly cautious about
lending policies that might produce statistically adverse effects on
minority groups.62 Some of the banks’ fears were heightened when the
Justice Department and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau sued a
New Jersey bank and reached a $25 million settlement based on claims
that the bank avoided operating branches in minority neighborhoods
(although that case arguably included circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory intent as well as discriminatory effects).63 The banks’
keen interest in the Fair Housing Act further intensified when cities
began filing FHA lawsuits to challenge lending discrimination that led
to the 2008 foreclosure crisis.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: BANK OF AMERICA V. CITY OF MIAMI
The Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) prohibits discrimination based on
race, not only in selling and renting homes, but also in any residential
real estate-related transaction, including mortgage lending.64 Bank of
America v. City of Miami65 was the first FHA lending discrimination
case to come before the Supreme Court. The case presented the Court
with the opportunity to revisit, in the home financing context, both the
“who is harmed” (standing) question and the “who is responsible”
(causation) question.
The City of Miami sued two of the nation’s four largest banks,
Bank of America and Wells Fargo, for mortgage lending
discrimination under the FHA.66 The City’s claim was that the banks
concentrated needlessly risky subprime mortgage loans in minority
neighborhoods, with the result that mortgage foreclosures,
abandonment, and housing vacancies were concentrated in those
61. Alex Gano, Comment, Disparate Impact and Mortgage Lending: A Beginner’s Guide, 88
U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1133–50 (2017).
62. Id.
63. CFPB and DOJ Order Hudson City Savings Bank to Pay $27 Million to Increase
Mortgage Credit Access in Communities Illegally Redlined, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU
(Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-and-doj-orderhudson-city-savings-bank-to-pay-27-million-to-increase-mortgage-credit-access-in-communitiesillegally-redlined/.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) (2012).
65. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
66. Id. at 1301.
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neighborhoods.67 The City sought damages from the banks for the
City’s increased expenditures for housing code enforcement, police
and fire protection, and property tax losses resulting from foreclosures
and home vacancies.68
The District Court granted the banks’ motions to dismiss, holding
that the City was not harmed in a manner that the Fair Housing Act
was intended to address, and that any discriminatory lending by the
banks was not the proximate cause of the City’s alleged losses.69 The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding the City’s
allegations of standing and proximate cause sufficient, relying inter
alia on the Supreme Court’s prior decisions in Gladstone Realtors and
Trafficante.70
The banks urged the Supreme Court to reverse the Eleventh
Circuit, advancing two arguments. First, the City should not have
statutory standing as an “aggrieved person” under Section 3602(i) of
the FHA because the harms the City alleged were not within the “zone
of interests” Congress intended to protect.71 Second, the harms alleged
by the City from concentrated mortgage foreclosures were not
proximately caused by the banks’ conduct, because the chain of events
connecting the alleged lending discrimination to the city’s losses
occasioned by vacant homes was too complex and attenuated.72
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion, joined by liberals
Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan, as well as conservative Chief Justice
Roberts, while moderate Justice Kennedy and conservative Justice
Alito sided with conservative Justice Thomas’ dissent.
On both issues presented, the Court adopted compromise
positions between those advocated by the City and by the banks. The
majority’s analysis of the statutory standing issue is curiously
ambivalent. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer began by
recalling that in its three prior cases, Gladstone Realtors, Trafficante,
and Havens Realty, the Court had said that in the Fair Housing Act,
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1307.
69. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, No. 13-24506-CIV, 2014 WL 3362348, at *5–6
(S.D. Fla. July 9, 2014).
70. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 800 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2015).
71. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1301 (2017).
72. Id.
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Congress conferred standing as broadly as Article III permits.73 Article
III standing requires only an allegation of injury in fact to the plaintiff,
a test the City had no trouble meeting. He added that Congress, aware
of the Court’s expansive interpretation of FHA standing, amended the
FHA in 1988 without altering the relevant statutory text.74 Had he
simply stopped there, the holding would have been crystal clear. While
other statutes75 may limit standing to plaintiffs within a narrow “zone
of interests” protected by those statutes, the FHA had not previously
been interpreted to include any such standing restrictions.
However, Justice Breyer was not content to reaffirm the clear
holdings of the Court’s prior FHA standing cases. He went on to write
that even if the banks’ arguments were accepted, and if the FHA were
read to limit standing to parties whose injuries meet some stricter
“zone of interests” test, the City of Miami’s injuries would meet any
such test.76 He described the prior cases as having held that plaintiffs
similarly situated to the city of Miami met the statutory definition of
“aggrieved person” under the FHA, i.e., the village in Gladstone
Realtors that asserted lost tax revenues, the nonprofit organization in
Havens Realty that alleged harm to its efforts to promote residential
integration, and the white residents seeking to preserve their integrated
community in Trafficante.77 This alternative rationale would seem to
undermine the preceding analysis—that based on the Court’s cases,
FHA statutory standing is as broad as the Constitution permits. It is
not clear why Justice Breyer needed to apply a narrow standing rule
that the Court was not adopting, unless perhaps to further rebut the
arguments of the dissent. The majority opinion seems to leave the door
at least somewhat open to a narrowing or revisiting of the broad FHA
standing holdings of Gladstone Realtors, Trafficante, and Havens
Realty in future cases.
The majority’s discussion of causation likewise leaves the reader
a bit perplexed. Justice Breyer began by rejecting the Eleventh
Circuit’s approach, which was to equate proximate cause with
73. Id. at 1303–04.
74. Id. at 1304.
75. The banks, and the dissenting opinion, relied primarily on Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., a 2014 case under the Lanham Trademark Act. 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388
(2014) (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970))
(interpreting standing under the Administrative Procedures Act).
76. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1304.
77. Id. at 1303.
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foreseeability.78 Under that approach, banks would be liable for
lending discrimination to any party whose resulting injuries were
foreseeable. Permitting all parties foreseeably harmed by lending
discrimination, Justice Breyer concluded, would lead down the
slippery slope to “massive and complex damages litigation.”79 His
solution was to invoke a directness requirement from cases under the
Lanham Act80 and the RICO statute.81 In this brief two-paragraph
discussion, the opinion ventures that “the general tendency. . . in
regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.”82 On the
other hand, what may be considered that “first step” in the causal chain
will depend on the nature of the statutory claim and on what is
administratively possible and convenient.83 Justice Breyer’s
uncertainty regarding the City’s claim of causation makes no reference
to the Court’s clear ruling in Gladstone Realtors, where Justice Powell
seemed to have no doubts that the harms caused by housing
discrimination to cities were direct and foreseeable:
A significant reduction in property values directly injures a
municipality by diminishing its tax base, thus threatening its
ability to bear the costs of local government and to provide
services. Other harms flowing from the realities of a racially
segregated community are not unlikely.84
Justice Breyer’s opinion concluded by leaving the precise rule
elaboration for “direct” or proximate causation under the FHA, and its
application, to the lower courts.85 As with the standing discussion, the
majority opinion left plenty of room for both the City and the banks to
advocate for their opposing interpretations as the litigation moves
forward. The City will claim that vacancy and neighborhood blight are
the direct result of discriminatory mortgage lending, while the banks
will argue that the chain of events from making risky mortgages to
neighborhood impacts is a chain going far beyond the “first step.”

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 1305.
Id.
Id. at 1299.
Id.
Id. (citing Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 10 (2010)).
Id.
Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 110–11 (1979).
Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1306.
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V. THE DISSENT
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, dissented,
and would have adopted the banks’ positions on both the standing
issue and the causation issue. Relying heavily on Lexmark, the Court’s
2014 Lanham Trademark Act decision, and limiting the prior FHA
cases to their facts, Justice Thomas would apply a narrow “zone of
interests” test in interpreting the statutory standing Congress granted
to “aggrieved persons.”86 He identified the quintessential aggrieved
persons in FHA cases as prospective homebuyers or renters who face
discrimination, but suggested that the outer limits of “aggrieved
persons” would include those who live in an apartment complex or
neighborhood that remains segregated as a result of discrimination.87
He explained the decision in Gladstone Realtors permitting a village
to sue as having implicated its statutorily protected interest in
preventing racial steering and segregation of the village. He went on
to assert that Miami was not claiming injury based on racial
segregation of its neighborhoods, but only the harm of tax revenue
losses, not an interest protected by the FHA.88
As for the second issue, Justice Thomas characterized Miami’s
claim as relying on a four-step causal chain, therefore too remote to
satisfy the proximate cause requirement.89 Banks allegedly
discriminated in the terms of mortgage loans, which led to
foreclosures, which led to vacant homes, which led to decreased
values for surrounding properties, and reduced city property tax
revenues. Justice Thomas concludes, without discussing the Court’s
prior FHA cases, that Miami’s chain of causation is too remote as a
matter of law to amount to proximate cause.90 He adds that
homeowners in neighborhoods devastated by foreclosures resulting
from discriminatory lending “clearly” could not sue banks under the
FHA.91

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 1307 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1310.
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1311–12.
Id. at 1312.
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VI. ANALYSIS
A. The Court’s Ambivalence on Standing and Causation,
and on the Systemic Nature of Racism
Justice Breyer’s opinion, like Justice Kennedy’s in the Texas
DHCA case, seems to tack between the broad and narrow views of
responsibility and remedy for racial inequality in America, and seems
to be searching for some middle ground. While reaffirming the broad
standing holdings of prior cases,92 he insists on demonstrating the
clear factual analogies between the standing of the City of Miami and
the village of Bellwood in Gladstone Realtors,93 as if to say the Court
is not adding to the categories of discrimination victims who may
bring future claims under the FHA. While recognizing that
discrimination may cause harms beyond those suffered by individual
parties to home purchase and finance transactions, Justice Breyer and
his colleagues seem reluctant to accept the consequences of that
recognition and are determined to cabin the types of harms FHA
plaintiffs may vindicate.
The majority’s equivocation on standing will be particularly
concerning to antidiscrimination advocates. The prior decisions in
Gladstone Realtors, Trafficante, and Havens Realty were abundantly
clear in extending FHA standing to any party meeting the
Constitutional test of injury-in-fact. Justice Douglas expressed it this
way in Trafficante: “[a prior Court of Appeals case found that the
words ‘person claiming to be aggrieved’ showed] ‘a congressional
intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of
the Constitution . . . . With respect to suits brought under the 1968 Act,
we reach the same conclusion.”94 The brief concurrence by Justices
White, Blackmun and Powell expressed skepticism that the plaintiffs
could even meet the basic injury-in-fact test of Article III, but went on
to say that the statutory language makes it clear that Congress intended
to extend standing broadly to include the plaintiffs.95
In Gladstone Realtors, Justice Powell, writing for the sevenjustice majority, again stated it plainly: “[s]tanding under § 812 [(civil
actions)], like that under § 810 [(administrative complaints)], is ‘as
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1304.
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
Id. at 212 (White, J., concurring).

51.2_WHITE_V.9 (DO NOT DELETE)

428

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

4/5/19 5:20 PM

[Vol. 51:413

broa[d] as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.’”96 Yet again
in Havens Realty, Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court,
wrote: “the sole requirement for standing to sue under § 812 is the Art.
III minima of injury in fact: that the plaintiff allege that as a result of
the defendant’s actions he has suffered ‘a distinct and palpable
injury[.]’”97 Justice Powell wrote a separate concurrence only to
express doubts about the Constitutional standing of the plaintiffs on
the facts presented, without questioning in any respect the scope of
FHA statutory standing.98
The idea that other federal statutes confer standing more narrowly
than Article III permits is not a new one. It cannot be said that the
Court in 2017 needed to revisit the Fair Housing Act standing cases in
light of new doctrinal developments in the law of standing. The banks’
“zone of interests” argument to narrow FHA standing in the City of
Miami case traces its origins to language from a 1970 case,
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.99
The Court in that case interpreted the Administrative Procedures Act
(“APA”), and found that the APA limits standing to challenge agency
actions to parties who are within the “zone of interests” protected by
the substantive statute underlying the challenged agency action, in that
case, the Bank Service Corporation Act.100 The Court applied this
statutory standing doctrine, sometimes characterized as “prudential
standing,” in numerous cases from 1970 through and including its
2014 decision in Lexmark,101 involving statutory standing under the
Lanham Trademark Act.102 On numerous occasions, the Court made
it clear that
the breadth of the zone of interests varies according to the
provisions of law at issue, so that what comes within the zone
of interests of a statute for purposes of obtaining judicial
review of administrative action under the “generous review
provisions” of the APA may not do so for other purposes.103
96. 441 U.S. 91, 109 (1979) (quoting Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209).
97. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
98. See id. at 366 (Powell, J., concurring).
99. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
100. Id.
101. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014).
102. Id. at 1384.
103. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997).
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The Court was obviously aware of the “zone of interests” standing
analysis on each of the three occasions, in 1972, 1979, and in 1982
when the Court interpreted the FHA as having no such statutory
limitation on standing. In fact, the Court of Appeals decision that the
Supreme Court reversed in Trafficante, the first of the three cases,
relied on the “zone of interests” standing test to deny standing to the
plaintiffs.104
Thus, Justice Breyer’s separate application of a “zone of interest”
standing test to the city’s FHA claims would be necessary only if the
Court were overruling its three prior FHA standing cases, something
his majority opinion clearly did not do. At most, he is pointing out
that, if the Court were inclined to reinterpret the FHA, City of Miami
would not be a proper case in which to do so. When he concludes that
“the City alleges economic injuries that arguably fall within the FHA’s
zone of interests, as we have previously interpreted that statute,” he is
necessarily saying that the zone of interests standing test under the
FHA is no more restrictive than the basic Constitutional standing
test.105
Plaintiffs other than rejected minority housing applicants have
played an important role in all the Supreme Court FHA cases and in
many significant lower court cases. Developers seeking to build
housing, nonprofit fair housing advocacy groups, and white neighbors
have all been recognized as having important stakes in FHA
enforcement and in having cognizable injuries flowing from
discrimination. The point was eloquently made in an amicus brief filed
in City of Miami by Anita Trafficante, the daughter of the plaintiffs in
the Trafficante case.106 The most direct victims of discrimination are
often unaware of the discrimination, are discouraged from vindicating
their rights, or have genuine concerns about retaliation. Paul and
Margaret Trafficante were white tenant activists who decided to
challenge their landlord’s discriminatory conduct when they were
faced with retaliatory eviction, and they later had to confront hate mail
and threats for their role in the case.107 Housing discrimination that
makes housing unavailable to minority groups, as in the case of
104. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158, 1160–64 (9th Cir. 1971), rev’d, 409
U.S. 205 (1972).
105. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1305 (2017).
106. See Brief for Anita Trafficante et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Bank of
Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) (No. 15-1111), 2016 WL 5940648.
107. Id. at 15, 18.
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exclusionary zoning, has no specific individually identifiable direct
victim other than the affected community. Private enforcement of the
FHA would not be possible if cities and towns, developers, fair
housing groups and neighbors could not bring suit.
At various times, there have been dissenting Justices who would
revisit the broad FHA standing holdings of Trafficante, Gladstone and
Havens Realty, including of course Justices Thomas and Alito, two of
the dissenters in City of Miami. The narrow views of both standing and
causation are deeply rooted in a non-systemic, limited view of racism,
as consisting of reprehensible acts of bigoted individuals against
identifiable minority persons, violating an egalitarian consensus, and
in Justice Thomas’ case, skepticism about the ability of the state and
the courts to remedy discrimination.108 The narrow view blames the
persistence of hypersegregation of African-Americans on the landlord
who will not accept a nonwhite tenant, the real estate agent who steers
a black customer to black neighborhoods, or on the benign choices of
black and white families moving to better schools, jobs and
environments.
The broader view of FHA liability challenges the
individualization of both the victim and the perpetrator. Certainly, the
bank defendants would be responsible, even under a narrow view, for
economic costs they imposed on minority homeowners who lost their
homes as a result of needlessly unfair and risky subprime mortgage
terms. The broader view makes the connection between those
individual mortgage loan decisions and the neighborhood impacts of
concentrated foreclosures, loan denials, and the resulting decline in
home values and economic activity. If the bank can point the finger of
blame at the white homeowner who flees an integrating neighborhood,
and the homeowner points the finger at the bank or the local zoning
board, no one is responsible for segregation.
American racism as a system excluded blacks from all but a few
neighborhoods and confined them to ghettos. The extreme racial
segregation in US cities has persisted for 150 years since
Reconstruction, and for fifty years since the second wave of civil
rights legislation, including the Fair Housing Act. But who is
responsible, and who, therefore, can be sued? The reality of racial
108. Scott Lemieux, Why Clarence Thomas’ Rulings on Race are so Idiosyncratic, NEW
REPUBLIC (May 23, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/142825/clarence-thomass-rulings-raceidiosyncratic.
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segregation is the product of thousands of actions and decisions,
including those by the white residents of Saint Louis who banded
together to record restrictive covenants in the 1920s, after the
explicitly racial zoning ordinances enacted by city councils were
struck down in Buchanan v. Warley, the New Dealers at the Federal
Housing Administration who drew up the redlining maps to direct
federal funds for home loans to white-only areas, and the publicprivate partnership between the Federal Housing Administration and
mortgage lenders who systematically excluded blacks from low-cost
home financing for the four decades following the Great Depression
and World War II. In such a system, the only way civil liability for the
harms caused by discrimination can function is with a causation theory
that recognizes multiple and simultaneous contributing causes, rather
than permitting every fair housing defendant to point the finger at
discrimination by others.
B. How Plaintiffs Will Demonstrate Causation After City of Miami
The holding of City of Miami on the standing issue is clear:
standing to bring Fair Housing Act claims still extends to any plaintiff
who demonstrates injury-in-fact, i.e., who meets the basic Article III
standing requirements.109 At the very least, cities economically
harmed by realtor blockbusting or bank redlining have standing to sue.
The challenge for plaintiffs after City of Miami will be to confront the
Court’s far murkier holding regarding proximate cause. The decision
clearly tells us that foreseeability of harm is necessary, but not
sufficient, to show proximate cause. Plaintiffs and courts will thus
have to grapple with the additional element of “directness” in
connecting defendants’ conduct to plaintiffs’ injuries.
Redlining and reverse redlining by banks cause several direct
harms to affected residents and communities. Redlining refers to
policies like those alleged in the Hudson City Bank case of refusing to
offer home loans in defined neighborhoods or communities.110 While
the Justice Department can pursue claims referred by various bank
regulators, its capacity to police the entire banking industry is
109. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1303–04.
110. CFPB and DOJ Order Hudson City Savings Bank to Pay $27 Million to Increase
Mortgage Credit Access in Communities Illegally Redlined, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU
(Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-and-doj-orderhudson-city-savings-bank-to-pay-27-million-to-increase-mortgage-credit-access-in-communitiesillegally-redlined.
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obviously limited. The causation issue for private plaintiffs
challenging bank redlining is to identify and prove the economic and
social injuries suffered in communities that are not being served.
Lender decisions to restrict access to mortgage credit in certain
neighborhoods have measurable and lasting consequences, including
lower home prices (and hence lower municipal tax revenues).111 The
most direct victims of redlining are the least likely to know about it,
or be in a position to assert FHA claims. The ability of cities and
nonprofit advocacy group testers to bring redlining claims is vital to
uncovering and preventing racial redlining.
Reverse redlining refers to the targeting of minority communities
for unfairly and unnecessarily disadvantageous home loans, including
those with high interest rates and fees, prepayment penalties, and other
terms not imposed on other homeowners.112 It may be easier to
identify reverse redlining victims, that is, individuals who obtained
unfairly priced mortgages, whose injuries can be readily
demonstrated. On the other hand, excessively risky mortgages leading
to needless foreclosures injure two distinct groups: the homeowners
who lose their homes, and their neighbors whose property and
community values are undermined.113 An extremely narrow view of
causation would hold that reverse redlining’s most direct victims are
the minority homeowners who are given needlessly expensive and
risky loans, and their direct injuries are measured by the difference
between the cost of their loan and the cost of a loan on fair terms
offered in comparable non-minority areas. This narrow view of injury
would absolve lenders engaged in reverse redlining from
responsibility for the overwhelming majority of economic harms
caused by their practices, the devastation that concentrated
foreclosures can inflict.114
VII. CONCLUSION
Banks, realtors, and landlords have failed to persuade Congress
to weaken private enforcement of the Fair Housing Act; they can be
111. Ian Appel & Jordan Nickerson, Pockets of Poverty: The Long-Term Effects of Redlining
(Oct. 15, 2016), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2852856.
112. United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 203 n.5 (D. Mass. 1998).
113. See Jacob Rugh, Double Jeopardy: Why Latinos Were Hit Hardest by the US Foreclosure
Properties, 66 J. URB. ECON. 164 (2009).
114. See G. THOMAS KINGSLEY ET AL., THE URB. INST., THE IMPACTS OF F ORECLOSURES ON
FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES (2009).
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expected to continue pressing the courts to do so. The courts should
decline the invitation to follow the path advocated in Justice Thomas’
dissent, a path perhaps left open in Justice Breyer’s ambivalent
majority opinion, the path of reinterpreting the Fair Housing Act to
restrict standing or impose novel causation requirements. The Fair
Housing Act is a Congressional statute, and the Supreme Court is
appropriately reluctant to overrule its own statutory interpretations,
because Congress remains free to amend a statute if the Court has
erred in its interpretation.115 This rationale has particular force in the
case of the Fair Housing Act. Congress amended the statue in 1988,
after the Court’s three standing decisions, not to cut back on private
civil enforcement actions, but on the contrary, to strengthen them, for
example by increasing the ceiling for punitive damages. As discussed
above, Congressional action was entirely consistent with the Court’s
broad standing decisions, and with the use of disparate impact analysis
later approved by the Court in the Texas DHCA case.116 In the nearly
fifty years since passing the Fair Housing Act, Congresses controlled
by Democrats and by Republicans have never once acted to restrict
civil enforcement of the FHA in the ways suggested by the banks in
City of Miami.
The second and deeper reason to preserve the broadest possible
understanding of who may seek redress for housing discrimination,
and whose conduct may be held responsible for it, is the fact that
housing discrimination and racial segregation are at the root of so
many other forms of racial inequality in our society. It makes little
sense to allow only first-order victims of discrimination to sue, nor to
allow only the first-level harms caused by discrimination to be
redressed, when housing discrimination has so many participants and
so many victims.

115. Patterson v. McLean Fed. Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989).
116. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507
(2015).
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